

## Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 PARIS 18384 01 OF 02 291921Z

50

ACTION EA-13

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 EUR-10 SP-02 PM-03 L-02 DODE-00

CIAE-00 INR-11 NSAE-00 RSC-01 NSC-07 PRS-01 IO-03

NSCE-00 DRC-01 /069 W

----- 029870

R 291830Z JUL 74

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1218

INFO AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH

AMEMBASSY SAIGON

USLO PEKING

AMCONSUL HONG KONG

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY TAIPEI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 18384

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, CB

SUBJECT: CHENG HENG'S VIEWS ON CAMBODIA SITUATION

REF: PARIS 18085 (NOTAL)

SUMMARY: PRIOR TO JUNE 30 RETURN TO PHNOM PENH, FORMER KHMER CHIEF OF STATE, REQUESTED EMBOFF TO CALL ON HIM AT KHMER EMBASSY RESIDENCE TO HEAR LATEST NEWS OF CAMBODIA DN TO GIVE HIS VIEWS BASED ON LIMITED CONTACTS WITH A VARIETY OF KHMER IN PARIS INCLUDING LEFTISTS. ACCORDING TO CHENG HENG THE KC WERE NOT INTERESTED IN NEGOTIATING NOW BECAUSE THEY THOUGHT THEY HAD A GOOD CHANCE OF A TOTAL VICTORY. THE KHMER PEOPLE SUPPORTED US EFFORTS TO HAVE THE FANK PURGED OF CORRUPT ELEMENTS. PRINCE MONIRETH WOULD BE A POOR CHOICE AS A POSSIBLE COMPROMISE LEADER SINCE SIHANOUK CONSIDERS HIM AN ENEMY. OUT OF CONSIDERATION  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 PARIS 18384 01 OF 02 291921Z

FOR PEKING'S REACTIONS, THE GKR SHOULD REDUCE CONTACTS

WITH TAIWAN. THE SOVIETS STILL FAVORED A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION IN CAMBODIA, BUT THOUGHT THAT LON NOL SHOULD GO. END SUMMARY.

1. KHMER COMMUNIST (KC) POSITION ON NEGOTIATIONS. DURING HIS STAY IN PARIS CHENG HENG HAS HAD CONTACTS -- SOME DIRECT, OTHERS INDIRECT -- WITH MEMBERS OF THE FUNK/GRUNK WHO ARE RELATED TO OR OTHERWISE CONNECTED WITH HIM. SINCE THEY ARE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT A MILITARY VICTORY IN CAMBODIA, THEY DO NOT THINK THAT IT WOULD SERVE THEIR PURPOSES TO NEGOTIATE WITH ANY OTHER KHMER. NATIONALISTS REJOINED THAT IF THE KC WERE SO SURE OF VICTORY, THEY SHOULD ACCOMPLISH IT RAPIDLY TO SPARE THE KHMER PEOPLE. KC REPLIED THAT IT WAS NECESSARY FOR THE FRUIT TO RIPEN. THEY EXPECTED THE DECLINE IN THE GKR'S INTERNATIONAL POSITION FROM AN UNFAVORABLE UN VOTE AND THE EROSION OF THE ECONOMIC POSITION IN GKR-CONTROLLED AREAS FROM INFLATION AND RICE SHORTAGE TO RIPEN THE FRUIT SOON. THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF TALKS WITH THE CURRENT "ILLEGAL" PHNOM PENH GOVERNMENT; CHENG HENG SUGGESTED THE FUNK/GUNK INDICATE WHOM THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO TALK WITH, AND THE GKR COULD WORK SOMETHING OUT FROM THAT POINT.

2. MILITARY CORRUPTION AND REMOVAL OF GENERALS. CHENG HENG SAID THAT THE MILITARY, WHO HAD BEGUN UNDER SIHANOUK TO TRADE ARMS TO THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS, CONTINUED TO TRAFFIC IN ARMS AND MUNITIONS, NOW TO THE KC. OFTEN ENEMY RAIDS RESULTING IN THE LOSS OF SUCH SUPPLIES WERE IN EFFECT ARRANGED TO COVER THEIR ACTUAL SALE TO THE ENEMY. AMBASSADOR DEAN WAS AWARE OF THESE CORRUPT PRACTICES AND WAS BEING VERY ACTIVE IN ATTEMPTING TO STAMP THEM OUT. CHENG HENG HAD HEARD RECENTLY THAT DEAN WAS WORKING TO HAVE RETIRED ANOTHER 15 GENERALS WHO WERE EITHER INVOLVED IN SUCH TRAFFIC OR OTHERWISE A LIABILITY TO THE GKR. THE KHMER POPULATION WHOLEHEARTEDLY SUPPORTED DEAN'S EFFORTS.

3. PRINCE MONIRETH AS COMPROMISE LEADER. CHENG HENG SAID THAT HE HAD HEARD THAT US EMBASSY PHNOM PENH WAS CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 PARIS 18384 01 OF 02 291921Z

THINKING OF PREPARING SISOWATH MONIRETH AS A POSSIBLE COMPROMISE LEADER. MONIRETH WAS CONSIDERED AN ELDER STATESMAN WHO COULD HARMONIZE ROYALIST, NATIONALIST AND COMMUNIST ELEMENTS. IN ADDITION TO BEING SIHANOUK'S UNCLE, MONIRETH WAS RELATED THROUGH HIS WIFE TO THE THIOUNN FAMILY WHICH IS SO PROMINENT IN THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT. CHENG HENG THOUGHT HE SHOULD REMIND US THAT MONIRETH WAS CONSIDERED BY SIHANOUK

AS ONE OF HIS WORST ENMIES. NOT ONLY HAD MONIRETH ONCE BEEN CONSIDERED BY THE FRENCH A PREFERRED CANDIDATE FOR THE THRONE, BUT SIHANOUK CONTINUED TO THINK THAT MONIRETH HAD DYNASTIC AMBITIONS -- AND EVEN RECENTLY COMMENTED THAT MONIRETH WISHED TO PUT ONE OF HIS SONS ON THE THRONE. PERSONAL RELATIONS HAD ALSO NOT

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 PARIS 18384 02 OF 02 291922Z

50

ACTION EA-13

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 EUR-10 SP-02 PM-03 L-02 DODE-00

CIAE-00 INR-11 NSAE-00 RSC-01 NSCE-00 NSC-07 PRS-01

IO-03 DRC-01 /069 W

----- 029984

R 291830Z JUL 74

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1219

INFO AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH

AMEMBASSY SAIGON

USLO PEKING

AMCONSUL HONG KONG

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY TAIPEI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 18384

LIMDIS

BEEN CORDIAL; FREQUENTLY THE QUEEN HAD HAD TO SERVE AS A BUFFER BETWEEN THE TWO. CHENG HENG THEREFORE THOUGHT THAT MONIRETH WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO SIHANOUK, AND IT DID NOT SEEM THAT THE KC WOULD LIKE HIM ANY BETTER.

4. GKR CONTACTS WITH TAIWAN. CHENG HENG SAID HE HAD LONG ARGUED THAT THE GKR SHOULD REFRAIN FROM ANY ACTS INDICATING SPECIAL CONTACTS WITH TAIWAN. HE HAD RECENTLY HEARD THAT THE PRC HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT WAS PARTICULARLY ANNOYED WITH SOME RECENT KHMER VISITS TO TAIPEI, AND IT CONSIDERED GKR ACTIONS TO

CONSTITUTE INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF CHINA. CHENG HENG SAID THAT HE WOULD ATTEMPT AGAIN ON HIS RETURN TO CONVINCE LON NOL THAT ANY CONTACTS WITH TAIWAN SHOULD BE DISCREET AND EFFORTS SHOULD BE MADE TO REMOVE GROUNDS FOR PRC HOSTILITY.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 PARIS 18384 02 OF 02 291922Z

5. SOVIET ROLE IN CAMBODIA. CHENG HENG SAID THAT HE HAD ALWAYS MAINTAINED CLOSE RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS. SOME TIME AGO THE SOVIETS SAID THAT DESPITE RECOGNITION OF SIHANOUK, THEY DID NOT SUPPORT HIM. ON THE OTHER HAND, BECAUSE OF WORLD COMMUNIST OPINION THEY ALSO COULD NOT SUPPORT LON NOL. THEY ADVISED LON NOL'S DEPARTURE FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT ABROAD -- THESE VIEWS WERE PART OF THE BACKGROUND OF THE SON SANN JANUARY PROPOSAL. ALTHOUGH CHENG HENG DID NOT INDICATE HE HAD HAD CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIETS IN PARIS, HE SAID THAT HE HAD GATHERED THAT THEY STILL FAVOR A COMPROMISE SOLUTION IN CAMBODIA WHICH WOULD MINIMIZE THE PRC PRESENCE, BUT THEY ARE UNABLE TO SUPPORT THE GKR BECAUSE IT HAS SO LITTLE POPULAR SUPPORT.  
STONE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** Z  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, INFLATION, RICE, POLITICAL SITUATION, COMMUNISTS, POLITICAL LEADERS, NEGOTIATIONS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 29 JUL 1974  
**Decaption Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** boyleja  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1974PARIS18384  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D740205-0946  
**From:** PARIS  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1974/newtext/t1974079/aaaaahrm.tel  
**Line Count:** 196  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ACTION EA  
**Original Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** LIMDIS  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 4  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** LIMDIS  
**Reference:** PARIS 18085 (NOTAL)  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** boyleja  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 26 APR 2002  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <26 APR 2002 by shawdg>; APPROVED <24 FEB 2003 by boyleja>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** CHENG HENG'S VIEWS ON CAMBODIA SITUATION  
**TAGS:** PFOR, CB, (CHENG HENG)  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005